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Abstract 
This article discusses the covert surveillance of post and telecommunications as a coercive 
measure in Swiss criminal proceedings. Since such surveillance interferes with a number of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, it should meet the requirements of human rights limitations. 
Firstly, the offence must constitute a so-called “catalogue offence” under Art. 269 para. 2 of the 
Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, there must be a strong evidence to suspect that such a 
catalogue offence has been committed in reality. In addition, the seriousness of the offence must 
justify the surveillance. Finally, previously undertaken investigative activities must have proven 
to be unsuccessful, or there are grounds to suspect that in absence of such surveillance the 
investigation will not succeed or will likely become disproportionately more complicated.  
Against this background, the authors analyze the latest amendments to the Federal Statute 
on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications (the BÜPF) and their impact on the conduct 
of criminal proceedings. 
Keywords: Switzerland, Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal proceedings, coercive 
measures, covert post and telecommunications surveillance, surveillance and production of 
metadata, IMSI-Catcher, revision of the Federal statute on the Surveillance of Post and 
Telecommunications (the BÜPF), Government-Software (the GovWare), requirements governing 
the use of the GovWare. 
 
1. Introduction  
Coercive measures are set out as an exhaustive inventory in Art. 196 ff. of the Swiss Code of 
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter - the CCP). Several types of such measures are stipulate by the 
CPP which can be used autonomously or can be combined. Coercive measures under the CCP 
should serve the goal of securing the evidence and ensuring the presence of a person during the 
proceedings. Such measures represent a set of procedural activities undertaken by criminal justice 
authorities which interfere with fundamental rights of the persons concerned. The term 
“fundamental rights” for the purposes of our present discussion includes not only rights set up by 
the Federal Constitution, but also those human rights which are protected by international human 
rights treaties [1, Art. 196, N 2]. Most often, coercive measures encroached on the right to personal 
liberty and security (Art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights), the right to respect for 
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private and family life (Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights), and the right to 
property (Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights). 
The European convention on Human Rights entered into force for Switzerland on 28 November 
1974. Yet Switzerland signed but not as yet ratified the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
There is a considerable number of coercive measures, stipulated for by the CCP. 
These measures include: obligating a person to attend court or administrative hearing, detention 
on remand, search, and seizure. There are also provisions on covert surveillance which include: the 
surveillance of post and telecommunications, the surveillance of technical monitoring devices, 
observation, as well as the surveillance of banking transactions and undercover investigations. Post 
and telecommunications surveillance is among the most frequently employed coercive measures in 
Switzerland. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
This article explores the procedure and human rights compliance of covert surveillance of 
post and telecommunications as a coercive measure. The principal sources are academic writings, 
decisions of the Federal Court, and the official documents of the Swiss Government. The review is 
based on analytical legal assessment and utilizes general methodologies of legal research. 
 
3. Discussion  
I. The Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications  
The covert surveillance of post and telecommunications was implemented in 2015 on a total 
of 9650 occasions. 3381 of the said cases constituted real time surveillance, and 6269 involved 
retrospective surveillance (retrospective production of traffic data and billing information – so-
called metadata) [2]. Various requirements for the corpus delicti of a criminal offence under 
investigation and for the subject of surveillance must be met in order for the surveillance to be 
authorised by the court as a coercive measure. In addition, the procedure must be clearly set out in 
law regulating the surveillance process from the point at which the surveillance is authorised to the 
point of concluding the outcomes of surveillance accompanied by obligations to provide 
information about the surveillance.  
A. Requirements concerning Communications  
The authorities are permitted to monitor the contents of post and telecommunications only 
when four cumulative requirements are fulfilled. Firstly, a crime must constitute a so-called 
catalogue offence under Art. 269 para. 2 of the CCP. Further, there must be strong evidence to 
suspect that such an offence has been committed in reality. In addition, the seriousness of the 
offence must justify the surveillance. Finally, previously undertaken investigative activities must 
have proven to be unsuccessful, or there are grounds to suspect that in absence of such surveillance 
the investigation will not succeed or will likely become disproportionately more complicated.  
1. Catalogue Offence under Art. 269 para. 2 of the CCP 
Art. 269 para. 2 of the CCP stipulates an exhaustive inventory or catalogue of offences. 
Surveillance can only be imposed in respect of the prosecution of one of the criminal offences set 
out in the catalogue [3] (e.g. homicide, theft, robbery, fraud, rape etc.) and the judge is not entitled 
to expand this inventory [4, Art. 269 N 28]. This ensures clarity with regards to those cases where 
surveillance is permissible yet it allows certain problems [5]. On the one hand, the choice of 
offences in the said catalogue can be somewhat haphazard [6, N 1184]. On the other hand, 
situations are possible when surveillance would also be proportionate in respect of less serious 
offences. In addition, the existence of a catalogue of offences could lead to a tendency to authorize 
the surveillance in respect of all offences set out in the catalogue, irrespectively of the specific 
circumstances of a certain case [6, N 1184].    
2. Strong Suspicion 
When it comes to catalogue offences, the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime has 
been committed is not per se sufficient to allow surveillance, rather it is essential that there is 
strong suspicion in the sense of Art. 197 para. 1 b) CCP (Art. 269 para. 1 a) of the CCP). 
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There several degrees of suspicion which are difficult to differentiate from each other [7]. 
According to the Federal Court, strong suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed is 
established when concrete indications exist «according to which the incriminating behaviour is 
substantially likely to meet the definition of the criminal offence in question» [8]. 
3. Proportionality 
In addition to the requirement that there should be a strong suspicion that a catalogue 
offence has been committed, it is necessary that the surveillance can be justified by the seriousness 
of the criminal offence in question. This requirement serves as a guarantee of proportionality of 
surveillance. Determining the proportionality of surveillance, the authorities should take several 
factors into consideration. It is essential to consider the seriousness of the offence, but it is also 
necessary to give due to the extent of suspicion, and the significance of interference with the rights 
of the persons concerned [4, Art. 269 N 23; 6, N 1186]. Finally, the likelihood of success of coercive 
measure should be taken into consideration in balancing the issue of proportionality of the 
surveillance [4, Art. 269 N 23].  
4. Subsidiarity 
It is significant to respect the principle of subsidiarity in the procedure of post and 
telecommunications surveillance. This implies that previously undertaken investigative activities 
should have been proven to be unsuccessful or that an investigation without surveillance would 
have no reasonable chance to succeed or would become disproportionately more complicated [9]. 
The subsidiarity test is usually easy to meet yet it can’t undermine its significance for human rights 
protection [10; 6, N 1187].  
B. Subject of Post and Telecommunications Surveillance 
The subject of surveillance is defined in Art. 270 of the CCP. It is important to distinguish 
between the functional subject of surveillance and the group of people which can be put under 
surveillance. 
From a functional perspective, postal addresses and telecommunication connections can be 
subject to surveillance. The surveillance of postal addresses includes information about the receipt 
as well as the dispatch of the post, the possibility to control the contents of post, and to copy or 
even substitute the contents of the post in certain cases [11]. In addition, post communications can 
be held back, providing that this is permissible under the provisions on temporary confiscation [4, 
Art. 270 N 2]. The surveillance of telecommunication connections includes all telecommunications 
falling under the scope of the Telecommunications Act (the TCA) [12]. It includes, in addition to 
telephone communications, also fax, pager, mobile telephone communications, as well as data and 
internet communications. The latter includes not merely e-mail communications but also all 
activities on the internet [13].  
When it comes to concrete persons who can be put under surveillance, the post and 
communications connections of the accused person (Art. 270 a) of the CCP) and third parties              
(Art. 270 b) pf the CCP) can be subject to surveillance. The surveillance of the third parties can only 
be imposed in two categories of cases: either, there must be indications suggesting that the accused 
person is using the postal address or telecommunication connections of the third party [14]; or, 
there must be a suspicion that the third party remains in communication with the accused person. 
In such cases, it is necessary that there is a suspicion that somebody is receiving messages on 
behalf of the accused or conveys such messages from the accused person to others. 
In decision of 6 November 2012 the Federal Court extended the scope of the term ‘usage’ of 
communication connections by proclaiming that the surveillance of telecommunication 
connections of a third party is permissible when it is very likely that this connection is being used 
to contact the accused person [15]. 
There are restrictions concerning surveillance of those persons who are bound by a duty of 
professional confidentiality under Art. 170-173 of the CCP (See Art. 271 of the CCP). In such cases a 
triage must be undertaken in order to set apart information which does not pertain to the 
investigation or which relates to the rules of confidentiality [16]. According to the revised version of 
Art. 270 of the CCP, such information must be destroyed and cannot be used in criminal 
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proceedings, unless there is a strong suspicion that the person bound by the duty of confidentiality 
has committed a crime, and that particular grounds exist which justify such an exception [17]. 
C. Imposing and Ending the Telecommunications Surveillance  
The surveillance of post and telecommunications can only be imposed by the prosecution 
authorities. While the order imposing the surveillance must generally be made in written form, in 
exceptional cases it can be imposed orally [18]. The information will be handed over, however, only 
once there is a written confirmation of the order [19; 4, Art. 269 N 44]. The surveillance order is 
passed to the «office of post and telecommunications surveillance» at the IT service centre of the 
Federal Justice and Police Department (ÜPF ISC-EJPD). This department conveys the request to 
the relevant telecommunications provider.  
Finally, the prosecution authorities must convey their requests to the court of law for 
authorisation of coercive measures. Within 24 hours since the imposition of the order, the 
authorities should submit their reasoning and any relevant files to the court for deciding on 
implementing the coercive measures (See Art. 274 para. 1 of the CCP). Dealing with these 
documents, the court can authorise the surveillance for a period of up to three months (See Art. 
274 para. 5 CCP). On the request of the prosecution, this authorisation can be renewed in every 
individual case for a period of up to three months (See Art. 274 para. 5 of the CCP). 
The prosecution must stop the surveillance without delay when the requirements for it are no 
longer fulfilled or if the court refuses to authorise or renew the authorisation of this coercive 
measure. If the surveillance is concluded on the initiative of the prosecution, this must be 
communicated to the court deciding on coercive measures (See Art. 275 para. 2 of the CCP). 
The surveillance is concluded on the basis of the order from the prosecution which is subsequently 
confirmed by the relevant public authority [20]. 
The person subjected to surveillance should, as a general rule, be informed on the finalizing 
of pre-trial procedure at the latest regarding the fact that he or she had been a subject of 
surveillance. The person whose telecommunications or postal address was under surveillance has 
the right to appeal against it within a period of 10 days from the day when he or she received such 
information, under Art. 393 ff. of the CCP (See Art. 279 of the CCP).  
D. Surveillance and the Production of Metadata  
The surveillance and the production of traffic and billing data (so-called metadata), as well as 
user identification data is regulated in Art. 273 of the CCP. Not merely the contents of post or 
telecommunications can be subject to surveillance. More general information is also subject to 
surveillance, such as e.g., information about who had contacted whom, when, and where, etc. 
The requirements for the procedure of gathering such data are less strict. There is no requirement 
that the crime would be a catalogue offence under Art. 269 para. 2 of the CCP. It is sufficient that 
there is a strong suspicion that a crime or offence or a misdemeanour in the sense of Art. 179septies 
CC has been committed. In addition, the principles of proportionality (See above II.A.3) and 
subsidiarity (See above II.A.4) must also be respected. Finally, the order that metadata should be 
produced must be authorised by the court deciding on coercive measures (Art. 273 para. 2 of the 
CCP). Metadata must be retained by post and telecommunication providers for a period of six 
months (Art. 12 para. 2, Art. 15 para. 3 of the BÜPF, Art. 273 para. 3 of the CCP).  
II. Recent Legislative Amendments  
The revision of the Federal Statute on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications (the 
BÜPF) resulted in amending the provisions regarding surveillance in the CCP [21]. 
These amendments provide for new types of surveillances measures to be employed, these 
provisions are extended ratione personae, and new changes regard the allocation of surveillance 
costs. Originally, it was proposed that the data retention period would be extended from six to 
12 months [22 p. 2781]. This proposal was subject, however, to considerable criticism in the 
Parliament which led after consultations to the compromise of reducing this period to six 
months [23]. 
Russian Journal of Comparative Law, 2016, Vol. (9), Is. 3 
78 
 
A. New Technical Measures 
The said legal amendments led to the adoption of two new statutory provisions incorporated 
into the CCP. These provisions regulate the covert surveillance of telecommunications by means of 
special technical equipment (Art. 269bis of the ED-CCP) and IT programmes (Art. 269ter of the ED-
CCP). This expansion is a reaction of the legislative authorities to the new means of communication 
which assist criminals in avoiding the situations of being subject to surveillance. New technical 
measures are designed to address such loopholes.  
1. Use of Special Technical Equipment  
The introduction of Art. 269bis in the ED-CCP allowed, in particular, to set up a legal basis for 
the extended use of the IMSI-Catchers [22 p. 2701, 2769; 4 Art. 269bis N 1]. This legal provision was 
intentionally broadly defined, in order to provide the authorities with opportunities to react on 
changes in telecommunication technologies and, if necessary, to use newly developed equipment 
for surveillance [4 Art. 269bis N 1]. The prosecution authorities are obligated, in accordance with 
Art. 269bis para. 2 of the CCP, to maintain statistical data on the use of surveillance. This obligation 
was introduced during consultations in the Parliament. 
a) IMSI-Catcher 
The IMSI-Catcher is a mobile device which simulates the functions of a mobile 
communications antenna [24, p. 281; 22, p. 2769]. Mobile devices in the vicinity of the IMSI-
Catcher communicate with it and are then connected by the Catcher to the next available mobile 
communications antenna. This enables the IMSI-Catcher, without the user of a mobile device being 
aware of, to intercept the traffic data. This allows the telephone number, the IMEI (International 
Mobile Station Equipment Identity) of the device and the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity) of the device’s SIM card to be logged [4, Art. 269bis N 2]. In addition, it allows to locate the 
position of the device within the network. The intention of the legislative authorities is to extend 
those measures, which are already employed, by means of Art. 269bis of the ED-CCP by creating a 
legal basis for using IMSI-Catchers for intercepting other data, and enabling monitoring telephone 
conversations and data which is sent and received [22, p. 2769]. The (restricted) use of IMSI-
Catchers is currently based on Art. 280 of the CCP [22, p. 2769].  
b) Requirements 
In order that special technical equipment may be used for the purposes of the surveillance of 
telecommunications, the following cumulative requirements must be fulfilled: According to Art. 
269bis a) of the ED-CCP, the requirements as set out in Art. 269 of the CCP regulating the 
surveillance of post and telecommunications must be met. Any measures concerning surveillance 
of telecommunications under Art. 269 of the CCP which had previously been undertaken must have 
been unsuccessful or surveillance conducted using such measures must have been deemed not to 
have a reasonable chance to succeed, or would likely to have become disproportionately more 
complicated (para. b). This type of surveillance is to be considered as subsidiary with respect to 
current surveillance possibilities [22, p. 2770]. An example of a case where such subsidiary 
measures can be employed is when, e.g., the IMEI or the IMSI is unknown and the 
telecommunication provider is unable for technical reasons to provide the requested data and, 
hence, surveillance by usual means is not possible [4, Art. 269bis N 9]. Finally, the equipment must 
be authorised for use by the Bundesamt für Kommunikation (the BAKOM) (para. c). 
The authorisation should be provided with respect of a specific user for a specific number of 
requisite pieces of equipment. This requirement is designed to prevent interference with normal 
telecommunications through the use of the equipment [22, p. 2771]. During the authorisation 
proceedings, the authority is also required to examine whether the equipment is sufficiently 
protected against the threat of manipulation [4, Art. 269bis N 10].  
2. Use of Particular IT Programmes  
In addition to the use of special technical equipment, the introduction Art. 269ter of the CCP 
is designed to enable the employment of special IT programmes. This is necessary in order to 
respond to technical developments in communications technology and to fill in the lacunae 
preventing the effective crime investigation [22, p. 2775]. In particular, the use of IT programmes is 
intended to deal with the problems resulting from the increased use of encrypted communications 
(Viber, Whatsapp) by the means of enabling surveillance through Government software                        
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(the GovWare). In such cases, surveillance is not possible through the usual means. The reason for 
this is that the relevant programmes encrypt the data directly on the individual devices and send it 
in separate data packages to the receiving device. This means that the relevant provider is unable to 
intercept all the data or to decrypt the data which it has intercepted [25, Rz 2]. 
a) Government-Software (the GovWare) 
The GovWare is an IT programme which is installed on the relevant electronic device 
(computer, laptop, smartphone, etc.) in order to carry out the programmed activities. These 
consist, in particular, of circumventing the encryption of data by ensuring that the encrypted 
communication is intercepted after it had been decrypted by the receiving device and forwarded to 
the investigating authority [25, Rz 5]. 
The IT programmes are also able to activate microphones or cameras on the infiltrated 
devices, and to pass on sounds or video recordings to the investigating authority, as well as to 
covertly search the devices for data. The use of the GovWare for such purposes is not permitted by 
Art. 269ter para. 1 of the ED-CCP [24, p. 280]. This means that any data collected must be 
immediately destroyed and cannot be used in criminal proceedings (See Art. 269ter para. 3 of the 
ED-CCP). 
The installation of the GovWare on the device under investigation can take place by various 
means. Firstly, the IT programme can be installed online – for instance by way of the e-mail. 
Secondly, criminal prosecution authorities can secure physical access to the relevant device and 
directly install the software. Finally, the user of the device might be induced to connect the device 
to a system which is already infiltrated by the GovWare [26].  
b) Requirements Regarding IT Programmes  
The GovWare must meet a number of requirements, in order for it to be utilised by criminal 
prosecution authorities. From a practical perspective, it is necessary that such surveillance can’t be 
discovered by a person under surveillance or by the anti-virus software installed on his or her 
device. Furthermore, it is necessary that the software can be quickly installed and deleted, if 
necessary, without the device being physically accessed. Finally, the software must be specially 
programmed for each deployment and adapted to meet the specific requirements in the case at 
issue [4, Art. 269ter N 5]. From a statutory perspective, Art. 269quater of the ED-CCP requires that a 
complete and unalterable protocol of surveillance by way of the IT programme should be 
maintained; this protocol forms part of file data in criminal investigation (para. 1). In addition, the 
extraction from the data processing system under surveillance to the requisite criminal prosecution 
authority must take place in a secure manner (para. 2). Finally, the software designers are 
obligated to provide criminal prosecution authorities with the respective source codes in order to 
allow examination of the program function of the GovWare (para. 3).  
c) Requirements Governing the Use of the GovWare 
The GovWare can only be used if the requirements, set out in Art. 269 paras. 1 and 3 of the 
CCP are met (Art. 269ter para. 1 a) of the ED-CCP). This means that there must be a strong 
suspicion that a crime has been committed, and the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
must be respected (See above II.A.4).  
The prosecution authorities must suspect one of the criminal offences set out in Art. 286 
para. 2 of the CCP (para. b). The legislator, therefore, relies on a more restrictive catalogue of 
offences applicable in the context of undercover investigations rather than the catalogue, set out in 
the context of conventional surveillance in the sense of Art. 269 para. 2 of the CCP. This was 
intended to reflect the seriousness of the interference with the rights of the person concerned               
[22, p. 2777 ff.]. This aim is generally to be commenced. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether in 
the context of undercover investigations references to the catalogue offences is a correct means of 
achieving this goal. This catalogue of offences was expressly created to serve the purposes of 
undercover investigations. Surveillance by means of the GovWare dos not have much in common 
with undercover investigations. This software is used to monitor a variety of means of 
communication. This is, with the exception of encrypted communications delivered by way of, e.g., 
Viber, already possible by way of conventional means of surveillance under Art. 269 of the CCP. 
Consequently, it would have been preferable to refer to the catalogue of offences in Art. 269 para. 
2 of the CCP, to  afforded greater effort for examination of proportionality of the measure                             
[4, Art. 269ter N 5; 25, Rz. 25; 22, p. 2777 ff.]. 
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Furthermore, “double subsidiarity” is required so that to ensure that any telecommunication 
surveillance measures previously undertaken under Art. 269 of the CCP must have been proven 
unsuccessful, or must have been unlikely to succeed, or would have disproportionately complicated 
the investigation (para. c). 
The surveillance is prescribed on the basis of the so-called surveillance order. In the context 
of the use of the GovWare such order should specify both, the usual elements relating to the subject 
of the order, and the types of data which is sought. Finally, the rules must be determined with 
regards to non-public places which can be infiltrated, in order for the GovWare to be installed. 
B. Extension of the Law Ratione Personae 
The amendments to the BÜPF have led to the law being specified more clearly and extended 
ratione personae. This is currently regulated in Art. 1 para. 2 of the BÜPF. This legal provision 
refers to state or licenced providers, or those providers subject to reporting obligations of post and 
telecommunication services, and internet providers. In the future the group of person’s subject to 
the BÜPF (those under obligation to cooperate with authorities) is clearly defined and, depending 
on their respective activities, divided into six categories. Different obligations apply to various 
categories (See Art. 19 ff. of the BÜPF). For instance, a company can fall within several categories. 
Art. 2 of the BÜPF divides the groups of persons under obligation to cooperate into the following 
categories [27]: 
  Providers of post services in the sense of the PG [28] (para. a); 
  Providers of telecommunication services, in accordance with Art. 3 b) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 30 April 19975 (the TCA, SR 784.10) (para. b); 
  Providers of services, which reply on telecommunications services and which enable one-
way or multi-way communications (providers of derivative communications services) (para. c); 
  Operators of internal communications networks (para. d); 
  Persons which make their access to a public telecommunications network available to third 
parties (para. e); 
  Professional resellers of cards and similar means of enabling access to a public 
telecommunications network (para. f). 
These extensions of the law ratione personae enable filling in the existing lacunae in law. 
It means that all persons are covered by the recent legal amendments who are active in post and 
telecommunications, and who have access to data which could be of interest to criminal 
investigation [22, p. 2706; 24, p. 283]. 
C. Retention of Metadata  
 Initially the revision of the law intended also to the extend the data retention period from 
six months to 12 months, with the aim of optimizing the activities of criminal prosecution 
authorities. In some cases, the six-month deadline had expired before the criminal prosecution 
authorities were able to request the production of meta data [22, p. 2708; 24, p. 287]. Considerable 
opposition to this extension in the Parliament meant that ultimately the data retention period was 
not extended [29]. The criticism related, in particular, to the concerns about serious interferences 
with the rights of the person concerned and about the costs, associated with doubling the data 
retention period for post and telecommunication providers.  
In addition to the data retention period, there was a considerable and surprisingly intense 
discussion during the parliamentary debates about the storage location of the retained metadata 
[30]. The National Assembly, in its capacity as the second chamber of the Parliament, introduced a 
new paragraph, para. 5bis of Art. 26 into the BÜPF. This was designed to obligate the 
telecommunication providers to store the metadata on the Swiss territory. Art. 26 para. 5bis of the 
BÜPF was ultimately deleted following the request of the conciliation committee [31]. This means 
that there is no requirement that metadata should be stored only in Switzerland. 
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D. Surveillance Costs 
The surveillance of post and telecommunications gives rise to a variety of costs. The providers 
who are under a duty to cooperate with public authorities are required, on the one hand, to create 
and maintain the necessary facilities. On the other hand, they also incur costs in the context of 
specific surveillance activities, in particular through staff expenditure. Currently the providers are 
obligated to cover these costs themselves. They do however receive appropriate compensation, 
which serves to cover some of the costs. Initially, it was intended that this remuneration should be 
later abolished. Following the cost analysis reports, however, the decision was made to abolish this 
proposal and maintain the current system. Consequently, criminal prosecution authorities 
imposing the surveillance measures will still be obligated to pay a global fee, which encompasses a 
fee for the «office of post and communications surveillance» and appropriate compensation for the 
services of the provider under the duty to cooperate. The authorities are required to pass on the 
compensation to the individual providers [See Art. 38 of the ED-BÜPF; 22, p. 2758 ff.; 24, p. 290].  
The decision to retain the granting of appropriate compensation appears justified. 
It represents an appropriate compromise between the state’s obligation to pay for the surveillance 
as a result of its monopoly on prosecution for crimes, and the general obligation to cooperate in the 
context of the investigation. The fact that the compensation does not cover the provider’s costs can 
be justified with references to the fact that experts and witnesses are also (only) entitled to 
appropriate compensation. Furthermore, the banks, the insurance companies, or the trustees, etc., 
are also required in the context of legal orders to produce information and to cover the costs 
associated with the production of the data [32]. Finally, the providers pursue their activities in a 
high risk field where they are able to make profits and are obligated to carry out business risks [33].  
 
4. Results 
If the prosecution authorities impose the surveillance of post and telecommunications it is 
essential that the fundamental rights of the person affected are respected, and the coercive 
measures can be justified by the seriousness of the crime in question in order to guarantee the 
proportionality requirement. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The amendments to the BÜPF succeeded to provide criminal prosecution authorities with the 
urgently required means to react to developments in technologies, and, consequently, in the means 
of communication. The outlined legal amendments have largely addressed the lacunae having 
existed in the area of effective criminal investigation. At the same time, the rights and freedoms of 
those persons concerned have been guaranteed to the largest extent possible. All the process of 
surveillance is regulated by statutory law and the persons are entitled with the right to appeal 
against the surveillance measures. The procedure for imposing the surveillance is clearly regulated 
and it sets out various protective measures in order to protect the persons involved in it from 
disproportionate interference with their rights. 
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Аннотация. Эта статья посвящена проблемам тайного наблюдения за почтовым 
сообщением и телекоммуникациями в качестве принудительной меры в уголовном процессе 
Швейцарии. Поскольку указанные действия затрагивают основные права человека, они 
допустимы лишь при соблюдении четырех требований. Во-первых, преступление должно 
быть "преступлением, включенным в каталог," согласно ст. 269 УПК Швейцарии. Во-вторых, 
у следствия должны быть "обоснованные подозрения", что деяние было совершено в 
действительности. В-третьих, тяжесть деяния должна соответствовать объему применяемой 
меры. В-четвертых, либо ранее предпринятые следственные действия оказались 
безуспешными, либо есть основания полагать, что неприменение такой меры приведет к 
"невозможности расследования или сделает расследование намного более сложным".  
Авторы анализируют законодательство и правила уголовного судопроизводства 
Швейцарии. Подробно исследована процедура применения указанной принудительной 
меры. Авторы изучают процедуру тайной проверки сообщений и телекоммуникаций, 
характеризуют предмет и правила хранения метаданных. 
Ключевые слова: Швейцария, УПК Швейцарии, уголовное судопроизводство, 
принудительные меры, тайная люстрация сообщений и телекоммуникаций, предмет 
наблюдения, наблюдение и метаданные, поиск IMSI, изменения Федерального закона о 
наблюдении за сообщениями и телекоммуникациями (BÜPF), правительственное 
программное обеспечение (GovWare), требования, управляющие использованием GovWare. 
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